MISCLASSIFICATION AND EMPLOYER
DISCRETION UNDER ERISA
James G. McMillan, llIt
In October 1998, the United States Department of Labor filed suit
against Time Warner Inc., a company that employs approximately 40,000
people, charging that the corporation illegally misclassified several hundred
freelance writers, reporters, and photographers as independent contractors
in order to avoid granting them employee benefits.' This is the first time
that the Department of Labor has brought suit claiming that workers were
improperly denied benefits.
Also in October 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held in Burrey v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 2 that a group of
clerical workers supplied by a temporary employment agency could sue the
company utilizing their services for benefits if they met the common-law
definition of employee. 3 The court refused to allow the company discretion
to determine whether
its benefit plans covered workers "leased" from an
4
outside agency.
As a result of these and other recent cases,5 it is unclear whether
employers may exclude certain classes of workers from employee benefits
programs. The Ninth Circuit in Vizcaino v. Microsoft found that the
software giant had misclassified employees as independent contractors in
order
to deny
them involving
benefits. 6Exxon
Other7 and
circuits
have come
to the aware
opposite
conclusion
in cases
Dupont."
Employers
of
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1. See Herman v. Time Warner Inc., 56 F. Supp.2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying
Time Warer's motion to dismiss); see also Jacob M. Schlesinger & Eben Shapiro, U.S.
Challenges Time Warneron Benefits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1998, at B20.
2. 159 F.3d 388 (9th Cir. 1998).
3. See id. at 394.
4. See id. at 391.
5. See infra Parts I.B-C.
6. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
CL 899 (1998).
7. See Abraham v. Exxon Corp., 85 F.3d 1126 (5th Cir. 1996); infra text
accompanying notes 127-41.
8. See Clark v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 105 F.3d 646 (4th Cir. 1997); infra
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these results are uncertain when they may depart from traditional
employment arrangements and when the law requires them to include
workers in their employee benefit programs. Historically, the role of the
courts and of the Department of Labor has been limited to ensuring that
employment arrangements are free of fraud and deceptive practice. When
determining what employment arrangements best meet their needs,
employers should be able to make informed decisions about the use of
independent contractors, leased workers, and temporary employees.
Companies should be able to provide benefits to employees without fear
that the federal government will later compel them to extend identical
benefits to entire classes of workers against their will and contrary to their
original intentions.
The Department of Labor's recent attempt to use the courts to compel
Time Warner to extend benefits to classes of workers that the company did
not intend to be covered by benefits is misguided and should have been
rejected by the district court. 9 Courts have traditionally left the
arrangement between freelance workers and the organizations that contract
for their labor to the parties involved and deferred to employers' decisions
regarding which workers will be covered by employee benefit plans. 10 In
the past, a suit claiming improper denial of benefits, such as the Time
Warner case, could only have been brought by the aggrieved individuals.
By bringing suit in the Secretary's name, the Department of Labor seeks to
substantially expand its authority so that it may bring suit on behalf of
classes of workers without identifying individual plaintiffs and without
deferring to employers.
n
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") '
was enacted to combat fraud and deceptive practice by employers
providing pension plans and other employee benefit plans. Related tax
incentives promote the social goals of expanding the availability of private
benefits programs.12 If the Department of Labor is allowed to use ERISA
to force employers to go beyond what the market, aided by tax incentives,
commands, more employers will be tempted to opt out of the voluntary
system altogether, or at least to reduce benefits to the vanishing point.
text accompanying notes 142-54.
9. See Herman v. Time Warner Inc., 56 F. Supp.2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). On
September 3, 1999, the district court denied Time Warner's motion to dismiss, holding that
the Department of Labor had stated a claim that Time Warner had breached its fiduciary
duty by misclassifying and denying benefits to temporary employees and independent
contractors. The court also held that the Department of Labor's suit was "appropriate." See
id. at 417-18; infraPart IV.
10. See infraPart lI1.A.
11. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1994)). In this Comment, citations to ERISA are to its section numbers.
12. See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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In the United States, all employer-sponsored employee benefit
programs are voluntary. Federal law does not require employers to provide
health or retirement benefits to any workers.
In the absence of
unconstitutional discrimination, federal law does not prohibit employers
from providing benefits to one group of workers and not to another. Once
an employer does decide to provide benefits, its promises to employees
come within the enforcement scope of ERISA. The tax code provides
incentives for those employers whose plans do not discriminate in favor of
highly-compensated employees. 3 For employer contributions to be tax
deductible, pension and benefit plans must meet the "nondiscrimination"
requirements of the Internal Revenue Code. 14 These rules do not require
that benefits be extended to all workers. 5
Congress intended ERISA to prevent fraud and deceptive promises in
the provision of benefits to covered employees. 6 It was intended that the
Act would to facilitate the voluntary growth of private pension and
employee benefit programs. It was never intended to mandate coverage for
all classes of workers.17 Using ERISA to force employers to extend
benefits to unintended classes of workers runs contrary to the purpose of
the statute and to the tradition of voluntary growth in employee benefit
programs.
Any attempt by the government to make the extension of
benefits compulsory, either through legislation or through the courts, is
unlikely to result in an increase in the total amount of benefits provided.
Given the high costs of benefits, employers will be forced to compensate
for mandated increases in one area by reducing benefits in others, or by
eliminating benefits programs altogether.' 9
The first part of this Comment will briefly review the legislative
history of ERISA and the statutory purposes behind it. It will demonstrate

13. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(4), 410 (West 1999).
14. See id. § 401(a) ("A trust... shall constitute a qualified trust... (4) if the
contributions or benefits provided do not discriminate in favor of highly compensated
employees ....
"). This six-line subsection is supplemented by over 350 pages of Treasury
Regulations.
15. See Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-4(b) (1999) (stating that classifications for determining
eligibility for benefits must be "reasonable" and "established under objective business

criteria").
16. See ERISA § 2(a) (stating that the policy of ERISA is to require disclosure and

provide safeguards "with respect to the establishment, operation, and administration" of
employee benefit plans).
17. See Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 325-26 (1992) (rejecting
the argument that Congress intended ERISA to apply to all common-law employees).
18. See H. Lane Dennard, Jr. & Herbert R. Northrup, Leased Employment: Character,
Numbers, and Labor Law Problems, 28 GA. L. REv. 683, 688 (1994) (documenting

substantial increases in employee benefits "both in total and as a percentage of
compensation" since 1929).
19. See id. at 728.
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that Congress, in enacting ERISA, did not intend to create a broad social
program. The second part of this Comment will consider employers'
responses to changing employment demands in the context of ERISA, and
the rise of contingent work arrangements, particularly the use of leased or
temporary employees. The third part of this Comment will consider a
number of recent federal court cases addressing the problems with
contingent work arrangements.
It will show that the courts have
consistently interpreted ERISA as affording employers broad discretion in
creating and maintaining plans for the benefit of their employees. This
deferential approach is consistent with the intent of Congress in enacting
ERISA, and with the public policy of promoting the growth of employee
benefits programs through voluntary employer participation.
Finally, this Comment will consider the implications of the
Department of Labor's suit, sustained by the district court in Herman v.
Time Warner Inc. 20 That suit is a clear departure from the intent of
Congress in enacting ERISA and from Supreme Court precedent in keeping
with that intent. It runs counter to twenty-five years of development of
employee benefit programs under ERISA. The suit is an attempt to remove
decision-making responsibility away from employers and to legislate
employee benefit coverage through the federal courts. Congress and the
courts have chosen not to dictate terms of employee benefit plans to
employers. The Department of Labor should not be able to do so either.

I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND

PURPOSES OF ERISA

President Gerald Ford signed ERISA into law on Labor Day, 1974.21
The law was the culmination of a process that had been under way since at
least 1963. In that year the Studebaker automobile company terminated
production at its South Bend, Indiana, auto plant and 4,400 employees,
members of the United Auto Workers lost all or part of their pension
benefits. 22 At the time there were no requirements for mandatory minimum
funding of private pension plans and there was no insurance to guarantee
benefits. Private pension plans were still a fairly new phenomenon and the
government had preferred to let the plans police themselves.23 Other than
20. 56 F. Supp.2d. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
21. See Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, in U.S. SENATE,
SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST
DECADE, at 6 (1984), reprinted in JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 62, 77 (2d ed. 1995).
22. See Michael Allen, The Studebaker Incident and Its Influence on the Private
Pension Plan Reform Movement, in LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 21, at 62; see also
Gordon, supra note 21, at 69-70.
23. Private pension plans had only become widespread as a result of union activity in
the mining, steel, and auto industries in the late 1940s. See WILLIAM C. GREENOuGH &
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disclosure requirements enacted in 1958, there had been no government
regulation of private pension plans prior to the enactment of ERISA in
1974.24
In 1965 a Senate investigation revealed that New Jersey labor leader
George Barasch had set up two union pension plans in ways that allowed
him to legally divert pension funds for his personal use.2 He appropriated
millions of dollars as "consulting fees" and as donations to "charitable
organizations" controlled by him in Liberia and Puerto Rico.2 6 At the time,
the law imposed no fiduciary duties on pension plan administrators or
trustees and provided no remedies. Without any enforcement mechanism,
it was impossible to prevent or punish the abuses of Barasch and others like
him.27 As a result, two of the main purposes of ERISA were to impose
fiduciary duties and to provide remedies for breach of those duties.
In 1967, Senator Jacob Javits introduced the bill that would eventually
become ERISA.2 Debate over the bill continued until 1971, when the
Senate Labor Subcommittee released a report showing that only five
percent of employees covered by private pension plans ever received
benefits. 29 Most employees were denied benefits because of minimum age
requirements or vesting requirements that demanded up to thirty years of
service or more before any benefits could be received. In the Studebaker
case, a fifty-nine year old worker with thirty-eight years of service was
denied benefits because he had not reached the age of sixty years when the
plant closed.30 The law at the time contained no vesting requirementsmost plans specified that benefits were "voluntary gifts" from employers
and that workers had no contractual or legal rights to benefits. ERISA
was designed to correct this situation by imposing minimum vesting
requirements and defining the rights of employees under their employers'
plans.
Public support for pension reform was growing. In 1973 consumer
advocate Ralph Nader published a popular book entitled You and Your
Pension.32 Nader called for the government to take over the pension
FRANCIS P. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY, at 27 (1976), reprintedin LANGBEIN
& WOLK, supra note 21, at 12-14.

24. The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 ("WPPDA") required full
disclosure to participants and beneficiaries, but provided no remedies for participants and
gave no enforcement power to any government agency. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 68.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See id. at 71.
See id. at71.
See id. at 71-72.
See id. at 72.
See id at 73.
See Allen, supranote 22, at 64.
31. GREENOUGH & KING, supra note 23, at 8.

32.

RALPH NADER

&

Allen, supra note 22, at 65.

KATE BLACKWELL, YOU AND YOUR PENSION

(1973), cited in
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system, create a series of mutual funds to be licensed by the SEC, and
provide immediate vesting and unlimited portability.33 Nader was never
called to testify at the Senate hearings because the Senate's goal was to
reform and regulate the private pension system, not to create a governmentsponsored system in its place. 34
Shortly after the bill was signed, Senator Javits succinctly stated the
reform and regulatory purposes of ERISA:
The problem... was how to maintain the voluntary growth of
private plans while at the same time making needed structural
reforms in such areas as vesting, funding, termination, etc., so as
to safeguard workers against loss of their earned or anticipated
benefits.... [The] new law represents an overall effort to strike
a balance between the clearly-demonstrated needs of workers for
greater protection and the desirability of avoiding the
homogenization of pension plans into a federally-dictated
structure that would discourage
voluntary initiatives for further
35
expansion and improvement.
ERISA was a response to the failure of pension promises in Studebaker and
similar plans, to the failure of private pension plans to self-police for
abuses like those of Barasch, and to the millions of disappointed workers
who were being denied benefits because of strict vesting requirements.
The law was intended to encourage and regulate private pension plans. In
enacting ERISA, Congress assumed that employee benefit plans would
continue to be voluntary.36 Congress did not intend ERISA as a radical
change and did not expect that it would force employers to extend benefits
to classes of workers that would not otherwise be covered. 37 Latter-day
efforts to use ERISA to force employers to extend benefits to additional
classes of workers are contrary to the legislative history and purpose of
ERISA.
II.

EMPLOYERS' RESPONSES TO
WORK ARRANGEMENTS

ERISA: THE RISE OF CONTINGENT

In the years since the passage of ERISA, the landscape of work in the
United States has changed3 8 but Congress has chosen to leave ERISA very
much the same. The law was originally intended as a regulatory
33. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 76.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 77-78.
36. See id. at 78.
37. See id. at 77 (stating that Javits's pension reform plan was "not an especially
revolutionary vision").
38. See generally RICHARD S. BELOUS, TiH CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF
THE TEMPORARY, PART-TIME, AND SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE (1989).
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framework for a voluntary system of pensions and employee benefits. That
purpose has been maintained by Congress and by the courts. From the
beginning, Congress has allowed employers freedom in deciding how to
structure work relationships and how to implement benefit programs. The
rise of contingent work arrangements, including employee leasing,
temporary help, and subcontracting, has occurred without substantial
interference by Congress or the courts. Congress has neither extended the
reach of ERISA nor made its provisions mandatory. This hands-off
attitude is in keeping with the purpose of ERISA to promote the growth of
voluntary employee benefit programs.
Employers in recent years have sought greater flexibility in work
arrangements in order to respond to the pressure of global competition and
to cope with legal requirements and the threat of litigation. The burden of
pension commitments has at times become unbearable for some employers
and has driven others toward consolidation. The rapidly increasing cost of
health care has forced employers to place more of the burden of health
insurance directly on employees and has contributed to the rise of managed
care. Many employers have sought to sever the employment relationship
altogether, and to distance themselves from workers in order to avoid
liability.
Thirty-six percent of working-age Americans with income of less than
twice the official poverty level have no health insurance.a9 Eight percent of
all American families with heads of household under age sixty-five have
out-of-pocket health care costs greater than ten percent of their household
income. 40 Given these figures, advocates of social change have suggested
that more of the health insurance burden and of the retirement income
burden should be placed on employers.4 1 Working people who rely on
part-time or temporary jobs are often not covered by employers' health
insurance and pension plans. Proponents of employer-based solutions
argue that federal laws governing employee benefits should be amended to
eliminate the loopholes that allow employers to avoid paying benefits to
workers who lack full-time employee status.42 They argue that the law
39. See Gail Shearer, Consumers Union, Hidden from View: The Growing Burden of
Health Care Costs (last modified 1/22/98) <http://www.consunion.org/healthO122exec.
htm>.
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., Sharon Dietrich et al., Work Reform: The Other Side of Welfare Reform, 9
STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 53, 60 (1998) (arguing that "amendments should be passed for
ERISA's participation and vesting standards, as well as for the anti-discrimination and other
statutes that employers manipulate to avoid covering contingent workers").
42. See Jonathan P. Hiatt & Lynn Rhinehart, The Growing Contingent Work Force: A
Challenge for the Future, 10 LAB. LAW. 143, 156-57 (1994); Clyde W. Summers,
Contingent Employment in the United States, 18 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 503, 519-20 (1997);
Steven L. Willbom, Leased Workers: Vulnerabilityand the Need for Special Legislation, 19
CoMP. LAB. L. & PoL'Y J. 85, 94 (1997); Temporary Employment and the Imbalance of
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should prevent employers from utilizing "peripheral" workers as a
permanent source of cheap labor.43
Today, workers are often "leased" from outside agencies on either a
temporary or a long-term basis instead of being directly employed. For-fee
employment agencies have been around since the 1890s. 4 Because of their
transitory relationship with workers, they have been closely regulated to
prevent abuses such as the charging of excessive fees. Temporary help
agencies, on the other hand, did not appear until the late 1940s.4, At first,
some states treated them as a type of employment agency and attempted to
regulate them as such. At the same time, state revenue departments and the
IRS found identification of workers with agencies to be preferable to selfemployment for purposes of collecting income taxes.4 Today, taxing
authorities regularly recognize temporary help agencies as employers, even
though that treatment often must coexist with conflicting treatment of their
status by other government agencies and by the courts. 47
During the 1950s and 1960s, the temporary help industry lobbied state
legislatures to exempt its members from regulation as employment
agencies and to recognize their status as employers. 48 By the early 1970s,
all but two states had recognized that temporary help agencies do not
present the same dangers, such as the charging of excessive fees, that
traditional employment agencies do, and had therefore deregulated the
temporary help industry. Its growth has been steady ever since.49
Since 1982, temporary employment has grown three times as fast as
overall employment.5 0
Temporary help agencies have increased
5
employment 240% since 1984, creating twenty percent of all new jobs. 1
Manpower Temporary Help Agency is now
the largest employer in the
52
United States, with over 600,000 employees.

Several factors have contributed to the growth of temporary
employment. First, temporary workers are widely used in the fastest
Power, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1647, 1653 (1996).
43. See EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT, THE NEW AMERICAN WORKPLACE:
TRANSFORMING WORK SYSTEMS

IN THE UNITED STATEs,

168-69 (1994); Virginia L.

duRivage, New Policiesfor the Part-Time and ContingentWorkforce, in NEw POLIcES FOR
THE PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WORKFORCE 89, 116-20 (Virginia L. duRivage ed., 1992).
44. See George Gonos, The Interaction Between Market Incentives and Government
Actions, in CONTINGENT WORK: AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN TRANSITION 170,
177 (Kathleen Barker & Kathleen Christensen eds., 1998).

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See id.
See id. at 180 n.9.
See id. at 180.
See icL at 181-82.
See id. at 185-87.

50. See PETER CAPPELLI ET AL., CHANGE AT WORK 75 (1997).

51. See id. at 76.
52. See id.
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growing segments of the economy-the trade and service industries.
Second, many of today's "high-performance organizations" believe that a
"buffer" of temporary employees improves the sense of job security and
morale of their permanent "core" employees.5 3 Third, some temporary
employees provide specialized skills that may not be available in-house.
Finally, many employers use temporary workers with the hope of reducing
labor and benefits costs, avoiding the costs of compliance with employment
laws, and reducing the risks of litigation.5 4
Whether, and to what extent, employers should be able to use
contingent work arrangements to reduce labor costs and avoid liability is a
question of public policy. Congress could have adopted a policy that
would have made benefits mandatory for all common-law employees, but
with ERISA it adopted a policy that allowed employers the flexibility to
determine who is an employee for purposes of benefits. ERISA promotes
and regulates voluntary employee benefit programs. It has never been used
to dictate the arrangements that may be made between employers and
workers.
Ill. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONTINGENT WORK ARRANGEMENTS

The congressional policy of promoting the growth of voluntary
employee benefit programs has been carried out by the courts that have
interpreted and applied ERISA. Much recent litigation has centered around
deciding who is an employee under ERISA and what rights employees
have.55 The definition of employee is of critical importance because that
definition can determine whether a worker or class of workers is entitled to
benefits. When Congress drafted ERISA, it deliberately left the definition
of "employee" open-ended,5 6 thus leaving decisions about eligibility for
benefits up to employers.5 7
In 1989, the Supreme Court ruled in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch, that, where the terms of an employee benefit plan allow, courts
should defer to an employer in determining who is an employee for
purposes of participation in a plan. 58 Three years later, in Nationwide
53. See id. at 76-77.
54. See id. (stating that most Title VII and tort liability arises in the context of hiring
and firing and wage and promotion decisions, which are not issues with temporary
employees).
55. See Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326-27 (1992).
56. ERISA defines "employee" as "any individual employed by an employer." ERISA
§ 3(6). An "employer" is defined as "any person acting directly as an employer, or
indirectly in the interest of an employer .... ." ERISA § 3(5).
57. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
58. See 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (finding that deference should be given to the
administrator if the benefit plan specifically gives the administrator such discretion to
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Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, the Supreme Court rejected arguments
that employment status should be defined by a worker's expectations of
receiving benefits.59 The Darden Court held that the traditional common
law of agency should apply when a court needs to define who qualifies as
an employee. 60 The Court endorsed the common law test because it "turns
on factual variables within an employer's knowledge., 61 The Court held
that employers should be able "to figure out who their 'employees' are and
what, by extension, their pension-fund obligations will be."62
The definition of "employee" and the benefits attached to a worker's
status are matters best left to the discretion of the employers and employees
themselves. The law need only inquire whether employment arrangements
are made freely and are fully-informed. Courts have made it difficult for
employers to "misclassify" employees as independent contractors 63 or to
"outsource" employment functions for the purpose of reducing benefits, 64
but at the same time they have preserved the rights of employers to
selectively grant benefits, to amend benefit plans, and to interpret plans in
determine eligibility).
59. See 503 U.S. at 326-27.
60. The issue in Darden was whether the plaintiff had standing as an employee to bring
suit, not whether his status as an employee would entitle him to benefits. The Court adopted
the test it had previously used in interpreting the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101:
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common
law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and
means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant
to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and
tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the
parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the
hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to
work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying
assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;
whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and
the tax treatment of the hired party.
Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490
U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989)).
61. Id. at 327. The Internal Revenue Service uses a twenty-factor common-law
definition that also turns on the facts of the case. See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
Factors not specifically addressed in the Darden definition include whether (1) the employer
trains the worker; (2)the worker is integrated into the employer's operations; (3) the worker
must submit oral or written reports to the employer; (4) the worker has a significant
investment in facilities used in performing the work; (5) the worker stands to realize a profit
or suffer a loss; and (6) the employer has the right to discharge or terminate the worker.
62. Darden, 503 U.S. at 327.
63. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997); see also infra Part
II.B.
64. See Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
520 U.S. 510 (1997); Frank J. Spanitz, Comment, Inter-Modal Rail: Will ERISA's Newly
Defined Welfare Benefit Noninterference Clause Curb Outsourcing?, 23 DEL. J. CoRP. L.
589 (1998).
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ways that are not unreasonable. 65

A.

The Standard of Review: Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch

The 1989 Supreme Court decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch provides the background for recent cases regarding the treatment of
contingent workers. Firestone defines the standard of judicial review
courts must apply to fiduciaries' decisions concerning workers' eligibility
for benefits. Prior to Firestone, courts had applied an "arbitrary and
capricious" standard in reviewing employers' decisions denying benefits to
employees. 67 Under that standard, an employer's interpretation of its plan
would be reversed only if "'a plan provision as interpreted had the effect of
denying an application for benefits unreasonably, or as it came to be said,
arbitrarily and capriciously .... , 68 The Firestone Court rejected the
arbitrary and capricious standard, finding that, in the absence of language
in the plan granting discretionary power to the plan administrator, courts
should apply a de novo standard, "review[ing] the employee's claim as it
would.., any other contract claim - by looking to the terms of the plan
and other manifestations of the parties' intent., 69 Under arbitrary and
capricious review, courts defer to the interpretation of the plan
administrator and rarely find the denial of benefits unreasonable. Under de
novo review courts do not defer to the plan administrator's interpretation,
but rather interpret the plan themselves. 70 Ambiguities are much more
likely to be resolved in favor of the employee under de novo review.
In Firestone, Firestone Tire and Rubber Company sold five plastics
plants to Occidental Petroleum Company.7 ' Most of the 500 Firestone
employees in the plants continued without interruption as employees of
Occidental.72 Several of the employees nonetheless sought compensation
under Firestone's termination pay plan, which provided for severance pay
following a "reduction in work force." 73 These employees argued that the
transfer from Firestone to Occidental constituted such a reduction. 74
Firestone's plan administrator refused to provide severance pay, finding
that the transfers were not a "reduction in work force" within the meaning
65. See Vizcaino, 120 F.3d at 1009.
66. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
67. See id. at 109.
68. Id. (quoting Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048,
1052 (7th Cir. 1987)).
69. Id. at 112-13.
70. Seeid. at ll5.
71. See iL at 105.
72. See id.
73. See iL at 105-06.
74. See id. at 106.
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of the plan.75 The employees brought a class action suit under ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B), which allows a participant or beneficiary of a plan to bring
suit "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan. 7 6 The
district court granted summary judgment for Firestone, holding that its
refusal of benefits was not arbitrary or capricious.77 The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed, applying a de novo standard of review rather
than an arbitrary and capricious standard. The Court noted that the
arbitrary or capricious standard is not appropriate where there is potential
conflict of interest because an employer is both fiduciary and administrator
of an unfunded benefit plan. 8
The arbitrary and capricious standard was imported into ERISA
jurisprudence from the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley)
("LMIRA"). 79 The Supreme Court in Firestone decided that the federal
common law of ERISA should be guided instead by trust law. ° A
deferential standard of review is appropriate under trust law only when a
trustee is granted discretionary powers by the trust instrument." Absent
such a grant of power, the trustee has no discretion to interpret the terms of
a trust agreement and the courts will construe the trust agreements under
contract law principles, without deference to either party. 82 ERISA defines
a fiduciary as one who exercises some degree of discretionary control; it
does not confer unlimited discretionary control."3 The Court concluded that
a denial of benefits challenged under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) should be
reviewed under a de novo standard unless the plan grants the administrator
or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility and to construe
terms.'
At the time the Firestone case was decided, many employers became
concerned that courts would no longer grant deference to the decisions of
plan administrators regarding eligibility for benefits. To the contrary,
Firestonewas not a serious blow to plan sponsors. The Court had provided
an "out" by allowing de novo review to apply "unless the benefit plan gives
the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine
eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan."' '
75. Id.
76. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B); Firestone,489 U.S. at 106.
77. See Firestone,489 U.S. at 106-07.
78. See id. at 107.
79. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(1994); Firestone,489 U.S. at 109.
80. See Firestone,489 U.S. at 110-11.
81. See id. at 115
82. See id. at 112-13.
83. See ERISA § 3(21)(A)(i) (defining a fiduciary as one who "exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of [a] plan or...
respecting management or disposition of its assets .... ."); Firestone,489 U.S. at 113.
84. See Firestone,489 U.S. 101 at 115.
85. Id.
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Consequently, employers have simply amended their plans to include terms
granting discretionary authority to plan administrators to determine
eligibility for benefits and to construe terms of their plans. Plan
administrators have not lost their discretionary authority. The Firestone
Court has merely reinforced the fundamental notion that the terms of the
plan govern. If the terms of the plan so provide, the administrator has
discretion. 6 If the plan does not grant discretion, the plan is treated as any
other contract. 87 Today, plans routinely include language granting the plan
administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility and to
construe the terms of the plan. Ultimately, Firestone did not have the
feared effect of replacing arbitrary and capricious review with de novo
review. Firestone stands merely for the proposition that the plan
administrator's authority comes from the terms of the plan itself.
B.

The Ninth Circuit:Vizcaino v. Microsoft

The discretionary authority of employers to determine eligibility for
benefits under their plans has been challenged in a number of recent cases
in which employers were claimed to have illegally "misclassified" certain
workers as independent contractors in order to deny them benefits. The
most prominent and perhaps most protracted of these cases is Vizcaino v.
Microsoft Corp.88
Plaintiffs in Vizcaino were workers who were contracted to Microsoft
between 1987 and 1990 as software testers, production editors,
proofreaders, formatters, and indexers. 9 These workers were collegeeducated and one had a law degree.9° They were paid a higher cash wage
in return for providing their own tax withholding, insurance, and benefits. 91
When they started work, they signed two documents regarding their status
as independent contractors. 92 One stated in part that the worker "agree[d]
to be responsible for all federal and state taxes, withholding, social
security, insurance and other benefits." 93 The other document explained
that "you are self-employed and responsible to pay all your own insurance
and benefits." 94 The freelancers' functions were essentially identical to
those of regular employees who received full benefits. 95 They were paid,
86. See id. at 110-15.

87. See id.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997).
See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1996).
See id. at 1200.
See id. at 1202.
See id. at 1190.
Id.

94. Id.
95. See id.
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however, through the company's accounts payable department instead of
through the payroll department and they were not paid overtime.96 Each
had worked continuously for more than a year.97
In 1989 and 1990, the Internal Revenue Service reviewed Microsoft's
employment records as part of an enforcement effort to combat a low
compliance rate among independent contractors. 98 Applying the commonlaw definition of "employee," the IRS found that Microsoft exercised
significant control over workers it had classified as independent
contractors, and ordered Microsoft to pay withholding and Federal
Insurance Contribution Act ("FICA") taxes. 99 Microsoft agreed to pay the
taxes and to pay overtime retroactively.' °° Some of the independent
contractors were converted into regular employees, while others were
required to accept employment with a temporary employment agency.
Their duties remained unchanged. ' '
Plaintiffs then attempted to claim eligibility as employees
retroactively under each of Microsoft's employee benefit plans, including
vacation, sick days, holiday pay, and health insurance, as well as the
company's 401(k) retirement savings plan and its employee stock
ownership plan ("ESOP"). 10 2 The Microsoft plan administrator refused
their claims because they had contractually waived any rights to benefits
when they signed the documents regarding their status as independent
contractors, 1°3 and because they were not "'regular, full-time employees in
approved headcount positions."'' 4 The plaintiffs took their claims to
federal district court.'0 5 The district court referred the case to a magistrate
judge, who recommended the rejection of all claims except those under the
401(k) and the ESOP.10 6 The magistrate found that the terms of the 401(k)
were ambiguous, so that the doctrine of contra proferentem' 7 required
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 1202 n.2. The IRS, estimating that independent contractors underpaid
taxes by two to three billion dollars a year, eventually reclassified 527,000 workers. Many
of these workers ended up employed by temporary help agencies. See Gonos, supra note
44, at 180 n.9.
99. See Vizcaino, 97 F.3d at 1190-91.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 1191.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 1191-92
107. The court explained the rule of contra proferentem as follows: "[w]hen a plan is
ambiguous on its face, we may, and typically do, consider extrinsic evidence to interpret it.
If the ambiguity persists even after resort to extrinsic evidence, we generally apply the rule
of contraproferentem and construe the ambiguity against the drafter." Il at 1194 (citations
omitted). This rule is highly unfavorable to the employer.
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construction in favor of the plaintiffs.' 8
The district court rejected the magistrate's recommendations regarding
the 401(k) and the ESOP.' °9 It found that contra proferentem was
inapplicable to the 401(k) because the intent of the parties to deny
participation was unambiguous. °
The plaintiffs appealed, and a three-judge panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with one judge dissenting, reversed,
agreeing with the magistrate on the issue of ambiguity.'
The 401(k)
defined "employee" as "any common-law employee who receives
remuneration for personal services rendered to the employer and who is on
the United States payroll of the employer."'1 2 On appeal, Microsoft
conceded that the plaintiffs were common-law employees, but argued for
the first time that "on the United States payroll" meant that participation
was limited to those who were paid through the company's payroll
department, and thus excluded independent contractors, who were paid
through the accounts payable department.1 3 The court of appeals found
Microsoft's construction reasonable, but also found that an "ordinary
meaning" interpretation could allow it to conclude that "payroll" meant "a
list of persons to be paid."'1 14 Since the plan administrator had not
construed the term "on the United States payroll," the court reviewed the
term de novo and applied the rule of contra proferentem in favor of
plaintiffs, noting
incidentally that it found plaintiffs' reading more
5
reasonable"

The dissenting judge argued that the plaintiffs entered their work
arrangement with their eyes open and that they had no expectation of
receiving benefits.' 1 6 He further argued that the IRS's classification of
workers as common-law employees for purposes of tax collection is
compatible with the parties' freedom to contract another arrangement for
purposes of employee benefits:
[T]he majority seems to overlook the constitutional right of
108. See id. at 1191-92. Since the ESOP was not an ERISA plan, the courts treated it
under Washington state contract law. For that reason I win not deal with it in detail here.
The magistrate found that because the ESOP expressly adopted the conditions of the

Internal Revenue Code requiring extension of the stock-purchase offer to all common-law
employees, and because Microsoft had incorrectly told the plaintiffs that they were not
common-law employees, the district court should find that the plaintiffs were eligible.
109. See id. at 1192

110. See id. With regard to the ESOP, the district court ruled that no offer was made and
that the plaintiffs could not have relied on any expectation of receiving benefits.
111. Seeid. at 1196.

112. Id. at 1192.
113. Seeid. at 1193.

114. Id. at 1194.
115. See id. at 1196.

116. See id. at 1201.
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private parties freely to enter into contracts of their own choice
and benefit. It is not for the courts under these circumstances to
add clauses to agreements that the parties never
contemplated .... Congress designed ERISA to protect benefits
workers already
had, not to give them benefits for which they did
17
not contract.1

On rehearing en banc, the full court agreed with the majority of the
three-judge panel that the plaintiffs were common-law employees and that
the agreements failed to waive their rights to benefits, but it remanded to
the district court for further remand to the plan administrator for
construction of the term "on the United States payroll." 8 Six of eleven
judges favored remand on the issue of eligibility for the 401(k)." 9 The
opinion of the court suggested that the plan administrator should find in
favor of plaintiffs.' 20
Three of the six judges, however, writing in
concurrence, argued that Microsoft should be free "to classify employees
for participation or non-participation in an ERISA plan based on whether
the employees were regular hires paid through the Payroll department
or
12
'freelancers' paid through the Accounts Payable department.1 1
As was the case after Firestone, many employers have viewed the
Vizcaino decision with consternation, fearing that courts would void
employees' agreements to waive benefits, thus depriving them of an
effective means of determining eligibility. The implications of the case are
not that extreme. Microsoft, by using waiver agreements, made clear its
intent not to provide benefits to certain workers. The court ignored that
intent because Microsoft conceded that plaintiffs were in fact common-law
employees.' 22 It is still possible for employers to differentiate independent
contractors from regular employees by clear documentation of their status
and by separate arrangements for their compensation.'2
Requiring
independent contractors to sign waivers of benefits may still be effective if

117. Id. at 1203.

118. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft, 120 F.3d 1006, 1013, 1015 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e
should not allow ourselves to be seduced into making a decision which belongs to the plan
administrator in the first instance."). The majority also agreed that plaintiffs were eligible
for the ESOP. Litigation on the ESOP continues. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 1998
WL 762381 (W.D. Wash. July 15, 1998), remanded by Vizcaino v. United States Dist.
Court for the Western Dist. of Washington, 173 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1999).
119. See Vizcaino, 120 F.3d at 1015
120. See id. at 1013 (stating that "the plan administrator should pay careful attention 'to
the panel's construction of 'on the United States payroll').
121. Vizcaino, 120 F.3d at 1022-23 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring in part) (arguing that
"the court's statements do not bind the plan administrator in any way"). These three judges
dissented from the finding that plaintiffs were eligible for the ESOP.
122. See Vizcaino, 97 F.3d at 1192-93.
123. See Renate M. de Haas, Vizcaino v. Microsoft, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 483, 498
(1998).
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those waivers include terms excluding workers who are later reclassified as
employees by the IRS. ' 24
Most important, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relieved
Microsoft of liability when it remanded the 401(k) issue to the plan
administrator. Assuming that the administrator would find that "on the
United States payroll" excluded plaintiffs, it is unlikely that the district
court would find abuse of discretion.'l 5 In effect, the court of appeals had
already found that Microsoft's plan administrator did have the discretion to
find plaintiffs ineligible for the 401(k). Even though Microsoft had not
presented its "on the United States payroll" argument to the trial court, the
court of appeals allowed the argument. 126 Further, although only three
members of the en bane court found the argument convincing, it still
granted Microsoft discretion to find that the term excluded plaintiffs.
Vizcaino illustrates that an employer's discretion in determining
eligibility for benefits is not lost when workers are reclassified by the I.R.S.
Even where the plan administrator fails to construe terms of the plan, as
Microsoft did with the term "on the United States payroll," a court will
likely remand the case rather than preempt the employer's discretion.
Vizcaino should therefore not be regarded as a defeat for employer
discretion. Employers must be cautious when drafting and interpreting
plans and waivers, but even when caution fails, courts are reluctant to make
eligibility decisions for them.
C.

Other Courts ofAppeals: Less Confusion

Other court of appeals cases have involved plan language that more
explicitly excluded non-employees, and plan administrators who more
clearly exercised their discretion in interpreting their plans. Where plans
have been drafted unambiguously and where plan administrators have
interpreted their plans unequivocally, it has been easier for courts to defer
to employers' discretion in denying benefits to independent contractors and
leased employees.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit case Abraham v. Exxon1 27
was a suit brought by workers whose functions resembled those of regular
Exxon employees, but who were nominally employed by outside agencies

124. See id. at 497 (citing Microsoft Employees Who Were Misclassified as Independent
Contractors Get Benefits, 5 ERISA LIG. REP. 10 (1996) (recommending plan language
providing that "the cash payments to [independent contractors] represent their sole
compensation, even if they are eventually reclassified as employees")).
125. See En Banc Decision by 9th Circuitin Microsoft Does Something, 6 ERISA LrrG.

REP. 4, 7 (1997).
126. See de Haas, supra note 123, at 487-88.
127. 85 F.3d 1126 (5th Cir. 1996).

854

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 2:4

that leased their services to Exxon.'2
The ERISA plan specifically
excluded leased employees and other "special agreement" employees. 29
As Microsoft did in Vizcaino, Exxon conceded that plaintiffs were
common-law employees. 30
Plaintiffs in Abraham relied on the district court case of Renda v.
Adam Meldrum & Anderson Co. 3 1 in which the court interpreted the
minimum participation requirements of ERISA § 202(a)(1)(A) prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of age or length of service.132 The Renda court
found that section 202(a) effectively prohibits discrimination against any
class of employees, other than those under twenty-one or with less than one
year of service.133 The Abraham court disagreed, and held that an employer
is free to
' 134deny participation "on a basis other than age or length of

service."

The Renda court also relied on Treasury regulations requiring that
plans must be nondiscriminatory in order to qualify for special tax
treatment. 135 The Renda court held that the Treasury regulations should be
used to determine who is eligible for benefits under an ERISA plan. 3 6 The
Abraham court disagreed here also, holding that a plan's failure to comply
with Treasury regulations could result in a loss of tax benefits, but "does
37
not permit a court to rewrite the plan to include additional employees.'1
In affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment, the
Abraham court held that the lower court correctly deferred to the plan
administrator's discretion. 3 ' The court elaborated on the process by which
a district court should review a plan administrator's decision to refuse
benefits. In determining whether the plan administrator's decision is
"legally correct,"'3 9 the court looks to: "(1) whether the administrator has
given the plan a uniform construction, (2) whether the interpretation is
128. See iL at 1128.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 1129.
131. 806 F. Supp. 1071 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
132. See ERISA § 202(a) (stating that a plan may not discriminate on the basis of age,
other than to require that a participant be older than 21, or on the basis of length of service,
other than to require a minimum of one year of service).
133. See Renda, 806 F. Supp. at 1081, cited in Abraham, 85 F.3d at 1130.
134. Abraham, 85 F.3d at 1130.
135. See Renda, 806 F. Supp. at 1083; 26 C.F.R. § 1.410(b)-(4)(c)(3)(1998) (defining the
requirements for a nondiscriminatory classification test).
136. Renda, 806 F. Supp. at 1083.
137. Abraham, 85 F.3d at 1131; cf Crouch v. Mo-Kan Iron Workers Welfare Fund, 740
F.2d 805, 809 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding an exception where an explicit provision in the
ERISA plan declares that it was to be "construed to meet the requirements of ERISA").
138. See Abraham, 85 F.3d at 1131 (finding that the plan gave the administrator
"discretionary and final authority to determine eligibility... [and] to interpret this...
Plan") (citing FirestoneTire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)).
139. Id.
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consistent with a fair reading of the plan, and (3) any unanticipated costs
resulting from different interpretations of the plan." '40 The Abraham court
held that Exxon's exclusion of leased employees met the first two standards
and that their inclusion would require extending benefits to 16,000
additional employees. 41
Abraham grants broad discretion to employers in determining
eligibility for benefits; the terms of the plan as construed by the plan
administrator are paramount. Even the loss of the plan's qualification for
tax deductions does not invalidate the employer's discretion. Under
Abraham, a court will even go so far as to consider the costs of expanded
eligibility in deferring to the plan administrator.
In Clark v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co.1 42 the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit also deferred to a plan administrator's decision to deny
benefits to a leased employee.' 43 Clark worked for DuPont's construction
division from 1962 until 1970.' 44 He was terminated when DuPont
eliminated the division.14 Between 1973 and 1993, Clark worked for
various companies that performed contract work for DuPont. 46 Clark then
applied for benefits under DuPont's insurance and vacation pay plans, as
well as under its stock ownership, savings, and investment plans. 47 The
plan administrator denied Clark benefits on the ground that he was not
eligible "under the plain language of the Plans."' 4 The district court, even
assuming that Clark was a common-law employee, granted summary
judgment for DuPont finding that the language of the plans specifically
excluded leased employees. 149
DuPont's insurance and vacation plans granted eligibility to "any
person designated by the Company as a full time employee.., on the
roll.., who continues to work at least 20 hours per week on a regular

140. Id. (citing Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 1992),
clarifiedby 979 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1992)).
141. See id. at 1131-32. Even though the court in Abraham found plaintiffs' Renda
argument without merit, it found that Exxon's plan administrator should have complied with
plaintiffs' request for information under the plan. See ERISA § 502(c)(1)(B). The court
remanded to the district court for determination of whether civil penalties should be
assessed against the plan administrator, but even here it allowed the district court to give the
administrator an "out" if it found that he had acted in good faith in refusing the information.
See Abraham, 85 F.3d at 1132.
142. 105 F.3d 646, No. 95-2845, 1997 WL 6958, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 9, 1997)

(unpublished disposition).
143. See id. at *3.
144. See id.at *1.
145. See id.

146. See id,
147. See id.
148. Id. at *1.
149. See id.
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basis.' 5° The plan administrator had always defined "on the roll" to
exclude independent contractors and leased employees.15 ' The court of
appeals found that the administrator's interpretation was unequivocal and
was not an abuse of discretion. 5 2 The ESOP and the savings plan
contained language recognizing that leased employees had to be counted
along with regular employees for tax qualification purposes, but expressly
excluded them from the receipt of benefits.153 The court, citing Abraham,
refused to find that the Internal Revenue Code or Treasury regulations
extended substantive rights to all common-law employees under ERISA
plans.' 54
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit likewise relied on
155
Abraham in Bronk v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph, Inc.,
another case involving leased employees. The plan administrator in Bronk
determined that the plans covered only "regular employees" and that leased
employees were not "regular employees.' 5 6 The court rejected the same
ERISA § 202(a) argument based on Renda that the Fifth Circuit rejected in
Abraham. 57 It also referred to an IRS notice specifically addressing
whether leased employees must be eligible for benefits. It quoted Q & A14 of Notice 84-11:
Q-14. Must a leased employee participate in the plan maintained
by the recipient [of leased employee services]?
A-14. No. Section 414(n)(1)(A) requires only that a leased
employee be treated as an employee; it does not require that a
leased158 employee be a participant in the recipient's qualified
plan.
Thus, the IRS confirms that reclassification of workers for tax purposes
does not override the employer's discretion in determining eligibility for
benefits.
Taken together, these cases show that courts will generally defer to
plan administrators who determine that leased employees or independent
contractors are not eligible for benefits. The deferential Firestonestandard
is alive and well. The problem in Vizcaino was that Microsoft left the
interpretation of the term "on the United States payroll" to the court. 5 9 The
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at *3.
See id.
See id. at *3.
See id. at *3 n.2.
See id. at *4; Abraham v. Exxon Corp., 85 F.3d 1126, 1130 (5th Cir. 1996).
140 F.3d 1335 (10th Cir. 1998).
See id. at 1337.
See id. at 1338-39.
Id. at 1339 (quoting I.R.S. Notice 84-11, availablein WL, FIX-RELS).
See Vizcaino v. Microsoft, 120 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 1997); see also supra text
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three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit surprised
Microsoft by finding the term ambiguous and construing it against the
company,'16 but the full court ultimately remanded the ERISA issue to the
plan administrator for construction of the term. 16' In Abraham, Clark, and
Bronk the courts dealt with terms that had already been construed by the
plan administrators, and the rule of deferential review was clear.
D. The Court ofAppealsfor the Ninth CircuitAgain: Burrey v. Pacific Gas
& Electric
In October 1998 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided
Burrey v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 62 Plaintiffs in this case were clerical
workers employed by several outside agencies in succession between 1982
and 1994, and leased to Pacific Gas & Electric Company ("PG&E").
PG&E maintained several employee benefit plans, including health and
severance plans, that did not specifically exclude leased employees from
coverage.' 6 PG&E's retirement and savings plans did expressly exclude
"leased employees, as defined by Section 414(n) of the Internal Revenue
Code."'164 The district court granted PG&E's motion for summary
judgment, finding that plaintiffs were excluded from the retirement and
savings plans as leased employees, and that they lacked standing to sue
165
under the other plans because the benefits had not vested.
The court of appeals reviewed the plan administrator's interpretation
of the plan under a de novo standard because the plan incorporated by
66
reference the terms of I.R.C. § 414(n), defining "leased employees.'
Because the plan required the administrator to interpret a federal statute,
the court refused to defer to the plan administrator's discretion in
interpreting that term of the plan.
At the time that plaintiffs claimed to have been covered by the PG&E
plans, I.R.C. § 414(n) read as follows:
[T]he term "leased employee" means any person who is not an
employee of the recipient and who provides services to the
accompanying notes 111-15.
160. See Vizcaino, 120 F.3d at 1018.
161. See id. at 1015.

162. 159 F.3d 388 (9th Cir. 1998).
163. See id. at 391.
164. See id. at 392.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 391-92. A plan cannot give an administrator discretion to interpret a
federal statute. See id. at 392. The court found that "[t]he interpretation of § 414(n) is a
question of law which we review de novo." Id. (citing Spink v. Lockheed Corp., 125 F.3d
1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that "interpretation of ERISA, a federal statute, is
reviewed de novo")).
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recipient if(A) such services are provided pursuant to an agreement
between the recipient and any other person (in this
subsection referred to as the "leasing organization"),
(B) such person has performed such services for the
recipient.., on a substantially full-time basis for at least 1
year, and
(C) such services are of a type historically performed,
in the
167
business field of the recipient, by employees.
The district court determined that plaintiffs were leased employees
under this definition, whether they were considered common-law
employees or not. 168 The court of appeals, however, focused its analysis on
the language "who is not an employee of the recipient" in the first line of
the subsection.1 69 Since the statute does not define "employee" in this
context, the court held that "'employee' as used in § 414(n) means
'common-law employee." ' 170 The court then concluded that if the plaintiffs
were common-law employees, they could not be considered "leased
employees" as defined in § 414(m) and
could not be excluded from benefits
171
plan.
the
under
employees"
"leased
as
The district court relied on Abraham in holding that leased workers
may be excluded from benefit plans even though they qualify as commonlaw employees. 72 The court of appeals did not contradict this principle. Its
holding was much narrower. It merely held that when a plan relies on
I.R.C. § 414(n) to provide its definition of leased employees, that definition
includes only those leased workers who cannot be classified as commonlaw employees.173 The court of appeals remanded to the district court to
167. 26 U.S.C. § 414(n) (1994), cited in Burrey, 159 F.3d at 391-92. Congress later
amended paragraph (C) to read "such services are performed under primary direction or

control by the recipient." 26 U.S.C. § 414(n)(C) (Supp.I 1996).
168. See Burrey, 159 F.3d at 391.
169. See id. at 394.
170. Id.
171. See id.at 393. The court also referred to the legislative history of the 1996
amendment, which stated that under both the old and new versions "the determination of
whether someone is a leased employee is made after determining whether the individual is a
common-law employee of the recipient." S. Rep. No. 104-281, at 93, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1567.
172. See Burrey, 159 F.3d at 394.
173. See id.; cf Clark v. E.L DuPont De Nemours & Co., 105 F.3d 646, No. 95-2845,
1997 WL 6958, at *3 (unpublished disposition) (4th Cir. Jan. 9, 1997) (holding that a plan
administrator may deny benefits to leased employees under the terms of a plan that excludes
workers "who must be treated as employees of the Company for limited purposes under the
'leased employee' provisions of § 414(n) of the [I.R.C.]" (brackets in original)); supra text
accompanying notes 142-54; see also Wolf v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.3d 1337, 1241-42 (11th
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determine whether plaintiffs were common-law employees. 74
For
employers, the implication is simple: if you incorporate federal statutes into
the terms of your plan, you may cede discretion to the courts.

IV. A NEW ROLE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR: HERMAN V. TIME
WARNER

In the past, suits challenging the denial of benefits have been brought
by individual plan participants under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) "to recover
benefits due." The recent suit against Time Warner was brought instead by
Secretary of Labor Alexis Herman, following an investigation by the
Department of Labor's Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration
("PWBA"). 75 This represents a radical departure in the procedure by
which such suits may be brought.
Until recently, ERISA was interpreted to allow individuals to bring
suit against employers for denial of benefits, or for breach of fiduciary duty
in the administration of a plan. 176 In the latter case, individuals could
recover damages only on behalf of the plan, not on their own behalf.177 The
Secretary of Labor could bring suit on behalf of a plan for breach of
fiduciary duty, but could not bring suit on behalf of individuals for benefits
denied.7 s That scheme was disrupted by the Supreme Court's decision in
Varity Corp. v. Howe17 9 when, for the first time, the Court allowed
individual plan participants and beneficiaries to bring suit to recover on
their own behalf in a case not involving denial of benefits. 80 Varity was a
suit brought by individuals, but the Court suggested in dicta that in the
future the Secretary of Labor might be able to bring suit to recover on
behalf of individual participants and beneficiaries. 8' Herman v. Time
Warner 82 is the Department of Labor's first effort to take advantage of that
license.
Cir. 2000) (distinguishing Vizcaino andBurrey on the ground that a leased employee who is
found to be a common-law employee must also be found eligible for benefits under the
terms of the plan).
174. See Burrey, 159 F.3d at 394.
175. See Herman v. Time Warner Inc., 56 F. Supp.2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Roseanne
White, PublisherSued Over Benefits: Time WarnerDenies Federal ChargesIt Misclassified
Temporary Workers, Bus. INS., Nov. 2, 1998, at 1.
176. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1985).
177. See id. at 144.
178. See id. at 142 n.9 (noting that "[i]nclusion of the Secretary of Labor is indicative of
Congress' intent that actions for breach of fiduciary duty be brought in a representative
capacity on behalf of the plan as a whole").
179. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).

180. See id. at 492.
181. Seeid.at510.
182. 56 F. Supp.2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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Varity Corporation was the parent company of Massey-Ferguson, Inc.,
a manufacturer of farm equipment."' Varity developed a plan called
"Project Sunshine," to dispose of money-losing divisions of MasseyFerguson, and to thereby relieve itself of obligations under medical and
84
other employee welfare benefit plans associated with those divisions.'
Varity persuaded 1,500 Massey-Ferguson employees to transfer to a new
subsidiary called Massey Combines by assuring them that their benefits
would be secure.1 5 It also assigned the benefit obligations of 4,000 retirees
to Massey Combines. In fact, Massey Combines was insolvent from its
date of incorporation and its books concealed a negative forty-six million
dollar net worth. By the end of its second year, Massey Combines was
bankrupt and its employees were without benefits. 86
Because Massey Combines was bankrupt, its non-pension benefit
plans ceased to exist and its employees could not bring suit for denial of
benefits. Nor could they bring suit against Varity, because they were no
longer participants in its plans. 87 The district court found that Varity was
liable for breach of fiduciary duty for having deceived the employees about
the viability of Massey Combines and the security of their benefits.'88
However, if a suit for breach of fiduciary duty permitted recovery only on
behalf of the plan, the employees would have had no remedy. Therefore,
the court found that the employees were entitled to a remedy on their own
behalf under ERISA.8 9
In deciding whether the employees were indeed entitled to a remedy,
the Supreme Court carefully analyzed ERISA § 502, the section providing
for civil enforcement of ERISA. 90
Section 502(a) lists "[p]ersons
empowered to bring a civil action." The most frequently used provision of
the section is § 502(a)(1)(B), which provides that:
A civil action may be brought(1) by a participant or beneficiary(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of
his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the
plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan ....

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See Varity, 516 U.S. at 492.
See id. at 493.
See id. at 494.
See id.
See id. at515.
See id. at 494.
See id. at 494-95.
See id. at 507-08.
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This provision is regularly used by individuals who have been denied
benefits under their plans.1 9' It provides a cause of action only for plan
participants or beneficiaries, not for the government. In Varity, however,
the employees had no cause of action under § 502(a)(1) because the plans
had been terminated upon the bankruptcy of Massey Combines.9 2
Subsection 502(a)(2) allows a civil action to be brought by the
Secretary of Labor "for appropriate relief under § 409." Section 409,
entitled "Liability for breach of fiduciary duty," provides only for recovery
by the plan as an entity, not by individual plan participants. 93 Under § 409,
a fiduciary may be required to:
make good to [the] plan any losses to the plan resulting from...
breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary
which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the
fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial
relief as the court
94 may deem appropriate, including removal of
such fiduciary.
Section 409 provides for damages in the form of compensation or
disgorgement in favor of the plan. Its most severe remedy is removal of the
offending fiduciary. It does not address denial of benefits to plan
participants or beneficiaries. Thus, § 502(a)(2) does not provide a cause of
action to the Secretary of Labor on behalf of individual plan participants or
beneficiaries. Varity breached its fiduciary duties, but § 502(a)(2) provided
no remedy for its employees. 195
Individual plaintiffs may look to § 502(a)(3), which provides for a
general cause of action:
by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of
the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this
title or the terms of the plan. 196
In Varity the Supreme Court found that § 502(a)(3) allows recovery
for individual plan participants and beneficiaries. 97 The Court concluded
that "it is hard to imagine why Congress would want to immunize breaches
of fiduciary obligation that harm individuals by denying injured

191. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 106 (1989).
192. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 515.
193. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985) (finding
that "Congress did not intend [§ 409] to authorize any relief except for the plan itself").
194. ERISA § 409(a).
195. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 509; Russell, 473 U.S. at 146.

196. ERISA § 502(a)(3).
197. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 515.

862

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 2:4

beneficiaries a remedy. 1' 9 This ruling allows the individual plaintiffs to
sue plan administrators for compensatory damages when they have no
cause of action for denial of benefits under § 502(a)(1).
While Varity allows recovery for individuals under § 502(a)(3), that
provision still does not allow the Secretary of Labor to sue for recovery on
behalf of individuals. Another subsection, § 502(a)(5), is parallel to §
502(a)(3) and provides a general cause of action to the Secretary.
Subsection 502(a)(5) allows a civil suit "by the Secretary (A) to enjoin any
act or practice which violates any provision of this title, or (B) to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief .... ,199 Until recently, this subsection
would not have been interpreted to provide recovery for individual
participants, but the Supreme Court's reasoning in Varity opens that door as
well.2°
In Varity, the Court noted Congress' 1989 addition of ERISA § 502(l),
dealing with the calculation of certain civil penalties.20 ' Subsection 502(l)
takes account of amounts "ordered by a court to be paid by such
fiduciary... to a plan or its participants and beneficiaries in a judicial
proceeding instituted by the Secretary under subsection... (a)(5).,, 202 The
Court concluded from the language of this amendment that in the future
"the sort of relief provided by both subsection (5) and, by implication,
subsection (3), would include an award to 'participants and beneficiaries,'
rather than to the 'plan,' for breach of fiduciary obligation., 20 3 The Court
assumed that Congress intended to provide recovery to individuals for
breach of fiduciary duty in suits brought either by individuals or by the
Secretary of Labor.2e4
The Time Warner case marks the first time the Secretary of Labor has
taken advantage of this opening. 2 5 In response to the suit, Time Warner
stated that the Department of Labor's actions "are unprecedented and
represent a clear departure from the DOL's longstanding recognition of the
limits of its jurisdiction., 20 6 The suit is unprecedented, but after the
Supreme Court's opinion in Varity, the Department of Labor has some
198. Id. at 513.
199. ERISA § 502(a)(5). This subsection is parallel to § 502(a)(3), except that §
502(a)(5) does not provide a cause of action for violation of the terms of the plan or to
enforce the terms of the plan.
200. 516 U.S. at 510.
201. See id.
202. ERISA § 502()(2)(B).
203. Varity, 516 U.S. at 510.
204. See id.
205. See Herman v. Time Warner Inc., 56 F. Supp.2d 411, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting
Varity, 516 U.S. at 511 ("a plan administrator engages in a fiduciary act when making a
discretionary determination about whether a claimant is entitled to benefits under the terms
of the plan documents")).
206. See White, supra note 175.
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rationale for its action.
The Department of Labor can claim statutory authority to bring suit
under ERISA § 502(a)(5), but it remains questionable whether the Time
Warner suit is what Congress and the Supreme Court intended. Varity
involved a gross breach of fiduciary duty. 207 The company persuaded
employees to transfer to a new subsidiary with the intention of bankrupting
the subsidiary in order to dispose of benefits obligations.20 1 Worker
misclassification suits have traditionally been brought under ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B) "to recover benefits due" because they involve not the plan as
a whole, but rather the benefits claims of individual workers. In Time
Warner, the Department of Labor is recharacterizing a misclassification
claim as a fiduciary duty claim. 09
In Varily, the Supreme Court anticipated that a plaintiff might
"repackage his or her 'denial of benefits' claim as a claim for 'breach of
fiduciary duty,"' but it discounted the possibility that such a change in
procedure would have any effect on decision making by plan
administrators. 210 The Court implied that the deferential standard of
Firestone should apply to fiduciary duty claims as well as to denial of
benefits claims. It noted that the Firestonestandard of review for benefits
eligibility decisions was based on the same principles of trust law that
govern review of fiduciary conduct.21 ' Nonetheless, where plaintiffs are
allowed to bring claims for denial of benefits under the fiduciary duty
provisions of ERISA, plan administrators are denied the opportunity to
determine eligibility and the determination is made in the first instance by
the district court.
Perhaps in anticipation of possible abuses by the Department of Labor,
the Court limited the effect of its finding in Varity, referring to the
language of § 502(a)(3), which authorizes "other appropriate equitable
relief' for breach of fiduciary duty. 2 The Court suggested that relief
under § 502(a)(3) would not be "appropriate" where recovery is available
through other ERISA provisions. 3 The Court granted relief to Varity's
207. See 516 U.S. at498.
208. See id. at 493-94.
209. See 56 F. Supp.2d at 418. The district court rejected Time Wamer's argument "that
the govermnent's breach of fiduciary duty claim is in reality an impermissible claim for
benefits...." Id. The court accepted the Department of Labor's argument that the plans
themselves may have been damaged by Time Warner's failure to include certain workers.
See id. Ironically, the court held that by not seeking "to restore specific benefits to
particular workers," id. at 418 n.3, the Department of Labor had properly "alleged injury to
the plans." Id. at 418. This approach allows the Department of Labor to bring suit against
any company that utilizes any workers who are not provided full employee benefits.
210. Id. at 513.
211. See id. at514-15.
212. ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B); see Varity, 516 U.S. at 514-15.
213. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 515.

864

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 2:4

employees under § 502(a)(3) only because they would otherwise have been
denied a remedy.2 14 Time Warner's freelancers would not have been denied
a remedy in the absence of the Department of Labor's suit.215 They could
have requested benefits from the plan administrator. Had the plan
administrator refused, they would have had a colorable claim for denial of
benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B), and could have brought suit on their own
behalf.216

Given the availability of recovery to the individual workers

under § 502(a)(1)(B), the Department of Labor should not have been able
to bring suit under § 502(a)(5).
Alternatively, the freelancers, like the transferred employees in Varity,
could have bypassed review by the plan administrator and brought suit
under § 502(a)(3) for breach of fiduciary duty. However, if they had
brought suit under § 502(a)(3) when they could have brought suit under §
502(a)(1)(B) for denial of benefits, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Varity
would demand that a court "respect the 'policy choices reflected in the
inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others' ' 217 in the statute
and dismiss the case. Time Warner is distinguishable from Varity because
the freelancers in Time Warner did not pursue benefits on their own behalf,
either under the ERISA provisions for denial of benefits or under those for
breach of fiduciary duty.
The Department of Labor is pursuing yet a third alternative by filing
suit under § 502(a)(5) on behalf of the freelancers. The Supreme Court in
Varity intended to provide a remedy of last resort for a group of employees
who were the victims of fiduciary malfeasance and who would otherwise
not have had a remedy. The Court did not intend to provide a menu of
remedies for workers to defeat employer discretion in deciding eligibility
for benefits. Nor could it have intended to provide a means for the
214. See id.; Time Warner, 56 F. Supp.2d at 417 ("The government may rely on the
catchall provision [of § 502(a)(5)] if the equitable relief required for complete relief is
unavailable under the other provisions in the statute.") (citing Varity, 516 U.S. at 512)).
215. The district court disagrees: "governmental action is appropriate here. Misclassified
employees, for example, may not even know that their rights under ERISA might have been
violated, a great many employees may have been affected, and the public also may have a
strong interest in the issues presented." Time Warner, 56 F. Supp.2d at 417-18. Under this
reasoning the Department of Labor need only allege that workers who might have been
eligible might have been denied benefits had they requested them.
216. See id. at 418. The district court held that individuals claiming to have been
misclassified need not exhaust their administrative remedies because the employer would
deny them access to the process as ineligible individuals anyway. The court misunderstands
the administrative process. A worker is not required to be eligible for benefits before
applying to the plan administrator for benefits. See ERISA § 503 (requiring the plan
administrator to give a "participant" reasons for refusal of benefits and to provide a
procedure for review); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 117
(1989) (holding that "participant" includes a claimant who has "a colorable claim that.., he
or she will prevail in a suit for benefits.").
217. Varity, 516 U.S. at 515.
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Department of Labor to sue2 18employers even when workers do not claim
benefits on their own behalf.
By bringing suit under the fiduciary duty requirements of ERISA, the
Department of Labor is attempting to bypass the usual review process
applied to individual claims. By repackaging a denial of benefits claim as a
fiduciary duty claim the Department of Labor is attempting to deprive the
plan administrator of the discretion to determine eligibility for benefits and
to construe the terms of the plans. The courts have made it clear that
ERISA should not be interpreted to compel employers to extend benefits to
unintended classes of workers. The Department of Labor's action in Time
Warner is an attempt to compel an employer to provide benefits to an
unintended class of workers without review by the employer's plan
administrator and in the absence of a complaint by the workers themselves.
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court could have intended to grant that
authority to the Department of Labor.
V.

CONCLUSION

ERISA was passed in 1974 for the purpose of promoting the growth of
voluntary employee benefit programs. That purpose has survived twentyfive years of change in the workplace. That same time period has seen
dramatic growth in employee participation in pension and welfare benefit
plans. Congress chose to promote this growth by allowing employers the
freedom to structure work arrangements and to classify workers for
purposes of benefits. Congress has likewise refrained from closely
regulating the temporary help industry and has allowed the development of
new, more flexible staffing alternatives without mandating benefits.
The courts have recognized and supported Congress' purpose by
allowing employers discretion in drafting and interpreting employee benefit
plans. The Supreme Court set the standard in Firestone by finding that the
terms of the plan are paramount and that, where the plan so provides, the
plan administrator's discretion will prevail. While plan interpretation is a
complex task, recent cases reinforce the principle of employer discretion.
218. The Department of Labor has also asked the court to appoint an independent
fiduciary to audit Time Warner's plans. See Time Warner, 56 F. Supp.2d at 415;
Independent Contractors: Time Warner Misclassified Employees Due Benefits, Labor
Department Charges, BNA EMPLOYMENT POL'Y & L. DAILY, Oct. 29, 1998, at dll. This
amounts to enforcement overkill. Such a measure has been taken in the past only in cases
where the plan fiduciaries presented an ongoing threat to the integrity of the fund. See
Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding appointment of independent
investment manager unnecessary where plan trustees had used $44 million of plan funds to
ward off a takeover, resulting in an $11.8 million loss); cf. Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d
1226 (9th Cir. 1983) (appointing investment manager where plan trustees made over $1.5
million in unsecured loans and paid $250,000 to a crony for a "feasibility study").
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The Department of Labor's suit against Time Warner is an attempt to
turn away from the intention of Congress in enacting ERISA and to reverse
the direction of the courts in promoting employer discretion. Congress
granted that discretion under ERISA in 1974, and neither Congress nor the
courts have seen fit to withdraw it. The Department of Labor should not be
allowed to supplant employer discretion either, and should not be able to
dictate eligibility for benefits by threatening employers with lawsuits for
supposed misclassification of workers.

